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THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY EXCEPTIONJUSTICE DEMANDS CONGRESS DEFINE A LINE
IN THE SHIFTING SANDS OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

The foreign policy adopted by our government is to do justice to
all, and to submit to wrong by none.
-Andrew Jackson1
The United States Supreme Court is restricted to enforcing federal
statutes passed by Congress,2 and as a result, justice is not always served.
Enforcement of the commercial activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA),3 in certain circumstances, exemplifies such injustice. Under the FSIA, a foreign state is generally immune
from United States jurisdiction. The commercial activity exception to
the FSIA is intended to deny foreign states immunity when they engage
in conduct that is based on a commercial activity carried on in the
United States.- The exception, however, contains a significant loophole 6
that allows foreign states to circumvent the jurisdiction of a United
States court by masking their commercial activity behind the otherwise
sovereign activities of a state agency. 7 The United States Supreme Court
decision Saudi Arabia v. Nelson8 illustrates this loophole.
In Nelson, an American citizen, Scott Nelson, alleged that he was
abused by his foreign government-entity employer. Nelson was a monitoring systems engineer for the Saudi Arabian-owned King Faisal Specialist Hospital.9 He obtained employment xvith the hospital through
advertisement and recruitment efforts in the United States. 10 While em1. Andrew Jackson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1883), in Political Quotations: A
Collection of Notable Sayings on Politics from Antiquity Through 1989, at 98 (Daniel B.
Baker ed., 1990).
2. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989); see Commissioner v.
Asphalt Prods. Co., 482 U.S. 117, 121 (1987); Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503,

512 (1981).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
4. Id. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602-11.
5. Id. § 1605(a)(2).
6. Daniel 3. Wolf, Impact of Nelson Will Extend Beyond Human Rights Cases, INSIDE
LrnrG., May 1993, at 17, 19.

7. See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
8. 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
9. Id. at 1474.
10. Id.
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ployed in Saudi Arabia, Nelson alleged that Saudi law enforcement
agents detained and tortured him in retaliation for his job-related duty
of reporting safety violations." After returning to the United States,
Nelson sued the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for his permanent injuries.' 2
The Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed Nelson's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
the FSIA, and Nelson appealed.' 3 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the lower court decision, granting
jurisdiction based on the commercial activity exception to the FSIA. 14
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court denied Nelson any legal redress
in United States courts, declaring that his claim was not" 'based upon a
commercial activity' within the meaning" of the commercial activity
exception. 15
Part II of this Comment outlines the history of the FSIA. Part Il
discusses the commercial activity exception to the FSIA and its treatment in the United States courts. Part IV, focusing on the Nelson decision, identifies and analyzes the current loophole in the Act. Finally,
Part V addresses the need for congressional action and proposes a solution. Absent congressional action, American citizens working on foreign
soil for foreign corporations may share Scott Nelson's plight and be denied any judicial recourse.
II.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Under the principle of sovereign immunity, recognized in both international law and the law of various states,' 6 a foreign state generally
cannot be sued without its consent.' 7 Sovereign immunity developed in
an attempt to define domestic jurisdiction while "respect[ing] the territorial integrity and political independence of other states."' 8
11. Id.
12. Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, No. 88-1791, slip op. at 5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 1989).
13. Id.
14. Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528, 1536 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson, 113 S.Ct. 1471 (1993).
15. Nelson, 113 S.Ct. at 1481.

16. See, e.g., GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CrviL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 335 & n.1 (1989).
17.

LUNG CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw:

POLICY ORmNTED PERSPECTIVE 242

(1989); see MALCOLM N. SHAw,INTERNATIONAL

A

LAW

431 (3d ed. 1991); Thomas H. Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State
Immunity, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 155, 158 (1981).
18. SHAw, supra note 17, at 430.
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The United States Supreme Court first addressed the concept of sovereign immunity in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon.19 There, Chief

Justice John Marshall, influenced by an executive branch suggestion,
granted a French warship docked in a United. States port immunity from
suit in United States courts. 20 Marshall described a nation's jurisdiction
within its own territory as "nec'essarily exclusive and absolute" and "susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. '21 He maintained that
foreign states were entitled, with
limited exception,' to "perfect equality
2' 3
and absolute independence.
This theory developed at a time when the foreign states were ruled
by personal sovereigns who generally personified the state.' Absolute
immunity persisted into the twentieth century,1s gaining the appropriate
title, "the absolute theory of sovereign immunity. 26 Under the absolute theory, private citizens dealing with foreign sovereigns in a commercial capacity had no legal remedy.2 7 However, as trading and other
commercial activities increased, the Supreme Court was criticized for ignoring State Department suggestions to restrict the privilege of sover19. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). The Court codified the common-law doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity and noted that it rests on the principle of mutual respect between
nations. Id. at 135-36; see Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
20. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 147.
21. Id. at 136.
22. Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that a sovereign would be understood to waive
its exercise of "complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction" where the foreign sovereigns, ambassadors, or troops were traveling abroad. Id. at 137-39.
23. Id. at 137.
24. Harvard Law School, Research in International Law, Draft Convention and Comment
on Competence of Courts in Regard to ForeignStates, 26 AM. J.INT'L L. 451,527 (Supp. 1932)
[hereinafter Draft Convention].
25. See Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68
(1938); Berizzi Bros. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (relying on The Schooner Exchange in
formally adopting the rule of absolute immunity). The Berizzi Bros. decision drew no distinction between the public and private acts of foreign states and disregarded the fact that The
Schooner Exchange did not extend to commercial activities of foreign states. Id. at 573. The
Court adopted the theory of absolute sovereign immunity primarily because of "the absence
of a treaty or statute of the United States evincing a different purpose." Id. at 574.
26. CHEN, supra note 17, at 243; see BORN & WESTrN, supra note 16, at 337; KENN= C.
RANDALL, FEDERAL CouRTs AND =
INTERNATIONAL HumAN RIGH-s PARADIGM 92
(1990); Sr W,supra note 17, at 433; see, ag., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S.
480 (1983).
27. See The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 481 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 255 U.S. 216 (1921); Robert V. von
Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLuM. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 3q40 (1978). Although foreign sovereign immunity forecloses plaintiffs redress in national
courts, a plaintiff may still apply to the foreign sovereign's judicial system. MARK W. JAMis,
AN INTRODUCTION TO INTfERNATIONAL LAW

351 (2d ed. 1993).
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eign immunity to a foreign state's noncommercial activities.2 8
After
World War I, international commerce and trade boomed. European
monarchs and other states left their traditional roles and entered areas
formerly left to the private industry by obtaining ownership of various
commercial and trade enterprises.2 9 This increased commercial involvement resulted in a variety of decisions that upset the stability of international commercial expectations. °
The Supreme Court, influenced by executive branch suggestions, increasingly considered a "restrictive approach" to sovereign immunity.3 '
The restrictive approach advocated extending immunity only to purely
governmental activities, 32 requiring courts to distinguish between public
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private governmental acts (jure gestiones).33 The distinction attempted to stabilize international commercial expectations and thus promote the free flow of goods and services
across national boundaries? 4
The United States State Department formalized its restrictive approach in the famous Tate Letter of 195231 by announcing that it would
"follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity," with the hope that
28. See, e.g., The Pesaro, 277 F. at 479-80 n.3.
29. Draft Convention, supra note 24, at 473-74 (declaring that "state operation of railways, telegraphs, radio ... [and] state monopolies such as those of tobacco, salt, matches, and
other common articles of commerce" brought the states out of the sovereign realm and into
the commercial context, requiring various countries to adopt exceptions to absolute immunity); see Harvey Schweitzer, Note, Sovereign Immunity and the Foreign State Enterprisein
Alaska, 4 UCLA-ALASKA L. Rnv. 343, 351 (1975).
30. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983); CHEN, supra
note 17, at 243; Frederic A. Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin,
Meaning and Effect, 3 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 11-13, 15-17 (1976).
31. See Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1945) (holding that the Court
would not enlarge state immunity unless it was recommended by the executive branch because
of its intimate association with foreign policy); Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588
(1943) (The Court noted that where the State Department recognized a foreign state's immunity claim, it was the Court's duty to dismiss the action. Relief, then, would be granted only
through diplomatic negotiations.); Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria Gen., 336 F.2d 354,358
(2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
The State Department typically made an initial determination of a foreign state's immunity
based on the legal and factual presentations of the foreign state. Upon reaching its decision,
the State Department then made a "suggestion" to the court where the immunity claim was
pending. BoRN & WESTrN, supra note 16, at 337. The courts gave varying weight to the
Department's suggestions. See, e.g., infra note 39 and accompanying text.
32. CHEN, supra note 17, at 243.
33. BoRN & WESrIN, supra note 16, at 337-38; CHEN, supra note 17, at 243; SHAW, supra
note 17, at 433.
34. CHEN, supra note 17, at 243.
35. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the U.S. Dept. of State, to Acting
Attorney General Phillip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprintedin 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984-85
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the courts would do the same. 6 The Tate Letter recognized immunity
for public or sovereign acts, but denied immunity for private acts.3 7
However, the Tate Letter failed to provide any criteria to distinguish
between public and private acts,38 which resulted in inconsistent executive determinations and case law regarding sovereign immunity.39 These
inconsistencies appeared in everyday political dealings. 40
When the State Department did not recommend the classification of
a foreign state's act or its immunity,41 the courts were left to decide
whether to grant immunity.42 For example, in Victory Transport,Inc. v.
ComisariaGeneralde Abastecimientos y Transportes,43 the State Department failed to suggest immunity. The Second Circuit refused to grant
immunity because it was not "plain that the activity in question [fell]
(1952), and in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 app. 2
(1976) [hereinafter Tate Letter].
36. Tate Letter, supra note 35, at 985 (recognizing that the State Department's shift in
policy cannot control the courts, but that "the courts are less likely to allow a plea of sovereign
immunity where the executive has declined to do so").
37. Id. at 984.
38. Id.
39. The courts split over the effect State Department suggestions of immunity should be
given. Some courts considered the suggestions binding. See e.g., Rich v. Naviera Vacuba,
S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710,726 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 295 F.2d 24,26 (4th Cir. 1961); Chemical Natural
Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venez., 215 A2d 864, 877 (Pa.), cert denied, 385 U.S. 822
(1966). Others declined to follow the suggestions. See eg., Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka
Nat'l Corp., 186 N.E.2d 676, 676 (N.Y. 1962). Typically, when a foreign state became a defendant in a United States court, it asked the State Department for help in determining the
likelihood of being granted immunity. The State Department then instituted informal hearing
procedures allowing the foreign state to argue in front of the State Department's legal advisor.
In turn, these advisors determined the foreign state's immunity status. See Michael H. Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The PlaintiffDeserves a Day in Court, 67 HARv.L. REv. 608, 61718 (1954); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States-A Proposalfor Reform of
United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 901, 912 (1969).
40. Rather than facilitate relations between foreign states, the State Department's determinations impeded foreign relations. Acknowledging this problem, Professor Lowenfeld declared that the "adjudication of a foreign government's pleas of sovereign immunity by the
State Department - particularly where the criteria are uncertain and the principles unclear
may well [have been] more of an irritant in day-to-day relations" than would a formal
adjudication by a court. Lowenfeld, supra note 39, at 913.
41. See supra note 31. Between 1960 and 1973, the State Department reached final decisions on a total of 48 cases. The State Department suggested immunity in 23 of those cases.
Victor Rabinowitz, Can the Courts Cope with the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act?, 1 N.Y.L.
ScH. J. INT'L & Compn. L. 130,134-35 n.13 (1980) (citing Immunities of ForeignStates: Hearings
on H.R. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 49-51 (1973)).
42. See, e.g., Victory Trans., Inc. v. Comisaria Gen. de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336
F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
43. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
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within one of the categories of strictly political or public acts."" The
Second Circuit declared that the restrictive theory accommodated the
"interest of individuals doing business with foreign governments in having their legal rights determined by the courts, with the interest of foreign governments in being free to perform certain political acts without
undergoing the embarrassment or hindrance of defending the propriety
of such acts before foreign courts."'4 5
While the courts and the State Department shifted responsibility, and
international political pressure increased over the restrictive theory,
questions arose about the executive branch's decision-making in what is
more properly the judicial arena. 46 The once seemingly "prudent attempt to minimize potential friction and foster good relations with other
states gradually became an onerous burden that ill served the best interests of the United States and those of private parties dealing with foreign
governments."'4 7 This disorder gave rise to two identical bills being submitted to Congress, one in each house, on October 31, 1975.48
From these bills came the FSIA.4 9 The FSIA completely lifted the
burden of determining immunity from the State Department and placed
it solely on the judicial branch5 0 The FSIA was intended to codify the
44. Id. at 360. The court went on to limit the acts to: "(1) internal administrative acts,
such as expulsion of an alien; (2) legislative acts, such as nationalization; (3) acts concerning
the armed forces; (4) acts concerning diplomatic activity; [and] (5) public loans." I1.
45. Id.
46. See Monroe Leigh, Editorial Comment, Sovereign Immunity-The Case of the
"Imias," 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 280,281 (1974); Sydney A. Patchett, Note, Nelson v. Saudi Arabia:
An Unrestricted Reading of the Restrictive Doctrine of Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 23 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM.

L. REv. 541, 550 (1991-92).

47. CHEN, supra note 17, at 244.
48. von Mehren, supra note 27, at 44. The Senate report stated, "at present, the law of
foreign state immunity in the United States is in a state of uncertainty." Jurisdictionof U.S.
Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1976) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 11315] (statement of Bruno Ristau,
Chief, Foreign Litigation Section, Civil Division, Department of Justice).
49. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1988).
50. "Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by the courts of
the United States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter."
Id. § 1602. The Act codifies "a comprehensive set of legal standards governing claims of immunity in every civil action against a foreign state or its political subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities." Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983). The
decisions are not completely depoliticized because the executive branch still files amicus curiae briefs in some cases to protect its foreign policy interests. See eg., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993); Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bol., 811 F.2d 1543 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). See generally Carolyn J. Brock, Note, The ForeignSovereign Immunities Act: Defining a Role for the Executive, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 795 (1990) (discussing policy reasons for
executive branch intervention in FSIA cases).
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restrictive approach,"1 and was consistent with immunity provisions of
other countries. 2
Currently, the FSIA is the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a
foreign state in United States courts.5 3 The FSIA, however, is not without limits. A foreign state is immune from the jurisdiction of a United
States court unless it falls outside one of the eight FSIA exceptions. 4

HI.

THE COMMERCIAL

AcTivrry

EXCEPTION TO

Tim FSIA

The commercial activity exception denies immunity for states "insofar as their commercial activities are concerned."55 The exception provides in pertinent part:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state ....
51. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6605 [hereinafter "H.R. RaP. No. 1487"]; see Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S.
Ct. 2160, 2165 (1992); Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 488.
52. E.g., State Immunity Act 1978 (U.K.), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123 (1978) (incorporating essentially the same principles as in the European Convention on State Immunity of 1972);
Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 No. 196 (Austl.), reprintedin 25 I.L.M. 715 (1986). This
reverence to a unified approach reflects an essential goal of peaceful and consistent reciprocal
treatment throughout international relations.
53. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1988). There are eight exceptions to the FSIA. The exceptions
consist of actions based on: (1) a waiver by a foreign state; (2) "commercial activity" having a
certain nexus to the United States; (3) property rights that were taken in violation of international law; (4) immoveable property rights located in the United States or property located in
the United States acquired by gift or succession; (5) particular noncommercial torts; (6) enforcement or confirmation of certain arbitral awards; (7) certain admiralty acts by the foreign
state; and (8) foreign state foreclosure of a preferred mortgage. Id. The list of exceptions is so
extensive that Judge Heaney, writing for a unanimous panel of the Eighth Circuit, characterized immunity as the exception rather than the rule. McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341,348 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985). For a discussion of the nexus requirement and relevant case law, see George Kahale I & Matias A.
Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction:Toward a Uniform Body of Law in Actions Against Foreign
States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 244-52 (1979).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988); see also RESTATEmENT (THmD) OF Tm FOREIGN RELALAW OF THE UNTED STATES § 451 (1993) ("Under international law, a state or state

TIONS

instrumentality is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state, except with
respect to claims arising out of activities of the kind that may be carried on by private persons.") [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
56. The full text of the exception provides:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States in any case
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The FSIA defines commercial activity as "either a regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act."' 57 To
determine the character of the activity, courts must look to the nature of
the course of conduct rather than its purpose.58 The primary test in determining whether the state engaged in "commercial activity" is
"whether the activity in question is one which private parties ordinarily
perform or whether it is peculiarly within the realm of governments."'5 9
In addition, courts are instructed to look at whether the foreign state
made its appearance in the marketplace as a merchant, or as a sovereign.60 If the foreign state makes an appearance as a merchant it may
then be held accountable in United States courts.61
Courts acknowledge that Congress's circular definition of "commercial" leaves the term largely undefined. 62 Congress provided such modest guidance, however, to allow the courts "to work out progressively, on
a case-by-case basis... the distinction between commercial and governmental. '6 3 The courts, using the FSIA's legislative history and strict language requirements, declared that a foreign state acts commercially
under the FSIA only when it acts as "a private player" engaging in the
market by performing "the type of actions by which a private party engages in 'trade and traffic or commerce.' "64 To determine whether an
act is commercial, the courts must identify the specific conduct on which

(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
57. Id. § 1603(d).
58. Id. (emphasis added). This "test" or "requirement" has-caused varied court interpretations. See infra notes 70-84 and accompanying text.
59. Hearingson H.R. 11315, supra note 48, at 53 (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, State Dep't.).
60. Id. at 30 (testimony of Bruno A. Ristau).
61. Id. (testimony of Bruno A. Ristau).
62. Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2165 (1992); see Joseph v. Office of
Consulate Gen. of Nig., 830 F.2d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988);
Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1108 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985).
63. Hearings on H.R. 11315, supra note 48, at 53 (testimony of Monroe Leigh).
64. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2166; see Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,
425 U.S. 682,704 (1976) (plurality opinion); Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr. v. Hellenic Republic, 877 F.2d 574,578 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 937 (1989); Joseph, 830 F.2d
at 1024.
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the action is based.6 5 This requires the courts to look at the nature,
rather than the purpose, of the activity.66 A strict interpretation of this
requirement implies that without further inquiry, certain activities would
always be commercial and denied immunity, while others would be forever governmental and granted immunity.67 For example, a state entering into a contract, regardless of its substance, would be engaging in
commercial activity,6s while a state utilizing its police power, irrespective
of the context, would always be engaging in governmental activity.6 9 As
such, courts have differed in their interpretation of exactly when the nature of an activity ends and the purpose begins.70
Courts have developed, 71 and commentators have suggested, 72 numerous tests regarding the interpretation of actions involving contract
65. De Sanchez v. Banco Cent. de Nicar., 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985); Texas Trading &
Milling Corp., v. Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1148 (1982) (offering a three-prong analysis with the identification of the relevant activity
first); Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the "Sovereign" Out of the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act"
A FunctionalApproach to the Commercial Activity Exception, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 489, 500
(1992).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).
67. See generally Donoghue, supra note 65.
68. Contracts by their very nature are commercial obligations and entering into such obligations typically require the government to lose its sovereign identity and take on the identity
of a private citizen. See Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907
(1824); see also Alfred Dunhill ofLondon, Inc., 425 U.S. at 695-96 (plurality opinion); Callejo
v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1108-09 (5th Cir. 1985).
69. The exercise of police power is generally characterized as governmental and therefore
sovereign. See, ag., Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1379 (5th Cir.
1980); Herbage v. Meese, 747 F. Supp. 60, 67 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 946 F.2d 1564 (D.C. Cir.),
cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 605 (1991) (denying jurisdiction because the case was based on arrest
and extradition); Tucker v. Whitaker Travel Ltd., 620 F. Supp. 578, 584 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd,
800 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986) (denying jurisdiction over the government defendant and declaring that a government's decision "whether and how to regulate an
industry, police the activities of its citizens, and investigate or assist in the investigation of
accidents" is peculiar to government and should not be scrutinized by United States courts);
Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1064 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); see also Hersch
Lauterpacht, The Problem of JurisdictionalImmunities of ForeignStates, 28 Brr. Y.B. Ir'L
L. 220, 237 (1951) (declaring that a state must receive immunity for "the executive and administrative acts of the foreign state within its territory").
70. E.g., Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 835 F.2d 160, 163-64 (7th Cir. 1987); De
Sanchez v. Banco Cent. de Nicar., 770 F.2d 1385, 1392 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Margot C.
Wuebbels, Note, Commercial Terrorism:A CommercialActivity Exception Under § 1605(a)(2)
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 35 Aruz. L. REv. 1123, 1130 (1993) (declaring that
the "courts have experienced difficulty in determining where the nature of an activity ends
and where the purpose begins. Often, the essence of an act is defined by its purpose, and
unless there is an inquiry into the purpose of such acts, their nature cannot be determined.").
71. See infra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
72. E.g., Donoghue, supra note 65, at 522 (espousing a four-step functional approach to
analyze sovereign immunity). Donoghue's analysis, though intended as an approach for all
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disputes. Some earlier courts avoided the per se denial of immunity to
states entering into contracts by looking beyond the act of entering into
a contract to the purpose or subject matter of the contract in deciding
whether the activity was sovereign or commercial. 73 For example, in
MOL, Inc. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh,74 Bangladesh cancelled
MOL's license to capture and export monkeys. 75 The court disregarded
the granting or canceling of licenses in general and classified the "nature" of the suit as the regulation of wildlife.7 6 The court then character78
ized such acts as sovereign 77 and granted immunity under the FSIA.

In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. , 7 9 the Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty in distinguishing between an act's nature and
purpose.8 0 Attempting to comply with the FSIA, s1 the Court defined an
act's "purpose" as "the reason why the foreign state engages in the activity."' In contrast, an act's "nature" was defined as "the outward form
'8 3
of the conduct that the foreign state performs or agrees to perform.
Including the phrase "agrees to perform" allowed the Court to eliminate
the per se denial of immunity for contract cases, by allowing the courts to
inquire into the substance of the contract. This interpretation, however,

actions commencing under § 1605(a)(2), would still leave no redress for American citizens
injured as a result of their employment activities abroad. Thus, the approach should not be
adopted in employment related claims. See generally infra notes 145-51 and accompanying
text.
73. E.g., MOL, Inc. v. People's Republic of Bangl., 572 F. Supp. 79, 84 (D. Or. 1983),
aff'd, 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984). See generally Donoghue,
supra note 65, at 501 (discussing courts' problems of "infus[ing] their definition of the relevant
activity with the purpose of the activity, with the activities of other components of the foreign
state, or with the overall operations the foreign state performed").
74. 572 F. Supp. 79 (D. Or. 1983), aff'd, 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S.
1037 (1984).
75. Id. at 81.
76. Id. at 84 ("The granting of such a license as part of a comprehensive regulation of
wildlife under the police power is an action in which the sovereign power is essential.") (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 85 ("The power to regulate the taking of game upon land owned by the landowner is an aspect of sovereignty," and, therefore, one in which private persons would not
engage.).
78. Id. at 84. The action was also barred under the Act of State Doctrine. Id. at 85.
79. 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992).
80. Id. at 2167.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
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does not eliminate the per se grant of immunity for acts that routinely
have been classified as governmental.84
Finally, the inquiry does not end with a characterization of the type
of activity. The lawsuit against the foreign state must also be "based
upon" that commercial activity8s Congress found an act to be based
upon a commercial activity if the foreign state's act has substantial contact with the United States.86 The Supreme Court has not addressed
what constitutes substantial contact under the statute,87 allowing lower
courts to create numerous variations.88 The majority view supports the
nexus test.89 This test requires a connection between the specific activity
that forms the basis of the suit and the sovereign's commercial activity;
that sovereign's commercial activity must then have substantial contact
with both the commercial activity alleged in the action and the United
States. For example, in Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann,90 the
Sixth Circuit concluded that the continuing course of conduct by an
agent of the Pechiney Corporation, as a representative in the United
States, was sufficient to meet the nexus test.91 Similarly, in America
West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd.,92 the Ninth Circuit noted that
although there was a commercial connection with the United States, the
84. E.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471,1479 (1993) (relying on Weltover to grant
immunity to Saudi Arabia for abuse of its police power).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
86. Id. § 1603(e).
87. The cases have typically been decided prior to reaching a "based upon" analysis or
they were classified under one of the other two allowable bases in the statute (that is, the act
had a direct effect in the United States or the act was performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere). E.g., Nelson, 113 S. Ct.
at 1477; Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992).
88. See Wuebbels, supra note 70, at 1131-35 (offering an analysis of the lower courts'
constructions of tests such as the literal, nexus, causal connection, doing business, and jurisdictional nexus tests).
89. E.g., Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528, 1534 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd on other
grounds, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993); America West Airlines v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793,796
(9th Cir. 1989); Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 452 (6th Cir. 1988);
Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civil Aviation of the P.R.C., 822 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987); De Sanchez v. Banco Cent. de Nicar., 770 F.2d 1385, 1391 (5th
Cir. 1985); Velidor v. IJPIG Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812, 820 (3d Cir. 1981); Vencedora Oceanica
Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 730 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.
1984).
90. 853 F.2d 445 (1988), enforced sub nom Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co.,
947 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1991) cert. dismissed, 112 S. -t. 1657 (1992). In a later proceeding
before the district court, the evidence presented clearly established substantial contact, and on
a second appeal was not disputed. Gould, 947 F2d at 220.
91. 853 F.2d at 453.
92. 877 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1989).
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connection was not related to the cause of action, and thus it failed to
meet the nexus test.93
In the case of an employee being abused by a government-entity employer, no court has addressed whether the act meets the nexus test.94
The Court determined that the acts do not constitute commercial activity; thus, the inquiry ends prior to undertaking the nexus analysis. 5
IV.

AND THE LOOPHOLE OF THE
COMMERCIAL Acrwrr EXCEPTION

NELSON V. SAUDI ARABIA

A.
1.

Nelson v. Saudi Arabia

96

The Facts

In September 1983, while in the United States, Scott Nelson read a
printed advertisement for a position as a monitoring systems engineer
for the King Faisal Specialist Hospital (the Hospital) in Ridyah, Saudi
Arabia.97 Hospital Corporation of America (HCA), a privately owned
corporation,9" had placed the advertisement. Since 1973, HCA contracted with Saudi Arabia to assist in employment recruitment for the
Hospital. 99

Nelson interviewed for the position in Saudi Arabia. 100 After his interview, Nelson returned to the United States and signed an employ93. Id. at 797.
94. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
95. Id.

96. The facts are compiled from the lower court and Supreme Court decisions as well as
the Petitioners' and Respondents' briefs submitted to the Supreme Court.
97. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1474. The advertisement described employment with the Hospital as a "passport to international opportunities" in a "beautifully landscaped medical city
located in the heart of the Kingdom." Respondents' Brief at 6, Nelson (No. 91-522). The
advertisement further stated, "Persons interested in [the] position will be employed by, have a
contract with, and work directly for the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia," and
directed inquiries to HCA in Nashville, Tennessee. l.
98. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1474.
99. Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528, 1530 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1471
(1993). The contract stated that Saudi Arabia was to have " 'ultimate authority for the operation of the Hospital,'" and required that Saudi Arabia " 'approve' " HCA's " 'standard form
employment contract... in order to assure that such contract adequately sets forth the conditions of employment of the Hospital deemed necessary by [Saudi Arabia].'" Respondents'
Brief at 6, Nelson (No. 91-522). The contract also specified that all employment contracts
were to be between Saudi Arabia and the employee, and Saudi Arabia was to "select the
candidates to be employed and shall set their salary and other remuneration." Id
100. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1474. Nelson later conceded that he falsely represented himself
as a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.) and had submitted a
forged diploma in order to obtain employment. Id. at 1475 n.1. This fact, however, is irrelevant because this case was brought before the Court on a motion to dismiss, and the allega-
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ment contract in Miami, Florida in November 1983.101 A month later, he
10 2
attended an orientation session conducted by HCA in Tennessee.
10 3
Nelson then flew to Saudi Arabia to begin his employment.
At the Hospital, Nelson was responsible "for the development and
expansion of electronic monitoring and control system capabilities" and
for recommending "modifications of existing equipment and the
purchase and installation of new equipment.

' 10 4

He also monitored all

hospital "facilities, equipment, utilities, and maintenance systems to insure the safety of patients, hospital staff, and others."105
In March 1984, during the course of his duties, Nelson discovered a
safety hazard 06 that he reported to an investigative commission of the
Saudi government.10 7 Over the next several months, Nelson repeatedly
reported the safety hazards to Hospital officials, 08 but was allegedly told
to ignore the problem. 0 9
Nelson stated that agents or employees of the Saudi government
summoned him on September 27, 1984 to the Hospital's security office,
where he was subsequently arrested. 1 0 Upon his arrest, Nelson alleged
that he was taken to the Saudi Arabia Criminal Investigation Division,"'
where he was detained in a jail cell and was shackled, tortured and
beaten by Saudi officials acting in their official capacity. 1 2 He alleged
that he was imprisoned for thirty-nine days and never charged with any
crime nor informed of the charges against him. 1 3 Furthermore, he altions in the complaint must be accepted as true. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327
(1991).
101. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1474-75.
102. Respondents' Brief at 6, Nelson (No. 91-522). At the program, Royspec in Maryland
was identified as the point of contact for family members who, in cases of emergency, wished
to contact Nelson in Saudi Arabia. Id.
103. Nelson, 923 F .d at 1530.
104. 1&
105. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1475.
106. Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1530. The safety hazard was a defective grease valve in the oxygen and nitrous oxide lines. Respondents' Brief at 8, Nelson (No. 91-522).
107. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1475.
108. Id.
109. Id110. Nelson, 923 F.2d. at 1530.
111. Petitioners' Brief at 8, Nelson (No. 91-522).
112. Id Nelson alleged that the abuse occurred for approximately one hour on the day he
was arrested. After he was transferred to await trial, he was jailed in a prison cell where he
"'slept on the floor,' with 'rats crawling all over' [him] and was denied adequate food." Id.
113. Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1530. While imprisoned, Nelson met at least twice with officials
of the United States Embassy in Saudi Arabia. In these meetings, the United States official
found that Nelson's claims were "not credible" because he had "no bruises or marks" and
found "no indication of undue stress." The State Department also determined that Nelson
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leged that his family was initially unaware of his whereabouts. 11 4 Eventually, Mrs. Nelson was advised of her husband's detention and was
allegedly told he could be released in exchange for sexual favors. 15
Nelson was finally released from prison on November 5, 1984.16
One week later, Nelson and his family left Saudi Arabia. 117 In America,
treatment and was declared permanently and toNelson sought medical
8
tally disabled."

Four years later, Nelson and his wife initiated a civil lawsuit naming
Saudi Arabia and the Hospital as defendants." 9 Royspec, a corporation
owned and controlled by Saudi Arabia that was responsible for purchasing the Hospital's supplies, was also named as a defendant. 2 0 Nelson
claimed the federal district court had subject matter jurisdiction based
on the commercial activity exception to the FSIA.12 1 Saudi Arabia
promptly moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."2
2. The Lower Court Opinions
The district court concluded there was not a sufficient link between
the recruitment process in the United States and the defendants to conwas arrested for "having presented Saudi officials with a fraudulent college degree from
M.I.T. as proof of job qualifications." Petitioners' Brief at 8, Nelson (No. 91-522).
114. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471, 1475 (1993).
115. Id
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Respondents' Brief at 8, Nelson (No. 91-522). The determination was made in a case
Nelson initiated with the Social Security Administration to receive disability insurance benefits. The court found Nelson unable to work "'because of the residual effects of being tortured while held as a prisoner in Saudi Arabia.' " Id (quoting In the Case of Scott J. Nelson,
No. 015-42-6023 (Department of Health & Human Services, Office of Hearings and Appeals,
Sept. 14, 1990)).
119. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1474-75.
120. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 923 F.2d 1528, 1530 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1471
(1993). The complaint contained 16 counts for which Nelson sought compensatory and punitive damages. Id. Ten counts alleged intentional torts. Six were directed against Saudi Arabia,
alleging battery, unlawful detainment, wrongful arrest and imprisonment, false imprisonment,
inhuman torture, disruption of normal family life, and infliction of mental anguish. Nelson,
113 S. Ct. at 1275-76. Three counts of negligence were also asserted, one against each defendant, on the basis of failure to warn Nelson of hidden dangers associated with his employment.
Id. at 1476. Finally, three counts were based on injuries Vivian Nelson had allegedly suffered
due to her husband's detention. Id. For purposes of this Comment, no distinction is made as
to the separate counts alleged. Rather, the discussion focuses on Saudi Arabia's activities and
their jurisdictional impact.
121. Id The Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1988).
122. Nelson, 923 F.2d. at 1530.
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stitute a substantial contact.'13 Thus, the actions against all124
the defendants were dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case.125 In a two-part analysis, the court of appeals first determined that the activity was commercial. 2 6 The court
announced that Nelson's recruitment and hiring in the United States was
clearly "part of a process having 'substantial contact with the United
States.' "127 Therefore, his recruitment and hiring "constituted a 'com-

mercial activity' of Saudi Arabia within the meaning of the FSIA."'1
The Eleventh Circuit then adopted the "jurisdictional nexus" test
outlined in Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nation-

ale Algerienne de Navigation.'29 This test required there to be a
"'nexus' between the acts giving rise to liability, and the commercial
activity carried on by the foreign state in the United States."' 30 The
court concluded that Nelson's detention and torture were "so intertwined with his employment" that the nexus requirement was satisfied. 3 ' Saudi Arabia appealed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari on June 8, 1992.132

123. Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, No. 88-1791, slip op. at 5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 1989), rev'd, 923
F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
124. Id.The district court further concluded that even if it could find a substantial contact
through the "indirect recruitment activities," there was not a sufficient "nexus" between the
activities and the complaint to support jurisdiction. Id. at 8.
125. Nelson, 923 F.2d. at 1536.
126. Id. at 1533.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1534 (citing 730 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1984)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1535.
132. Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W.
3827 (U.S. June 8, 1992) (No. 91-522).
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3. The Supreme Court Decision 133
Justice Souter delivered the Court's opinion, reversing the court of
appeals decision and granting Saudi Arabia immunity." 4 The Court's
five-four decision was based solely on its determination that the activities at issue were not commercial under the exception. 35
The Court began its analysis by identifying the particular conduct
forming the basis of the Nelsons' claim.' 3 6 After examining what "based
133. Saudi Arabia, King Faisal Hospital, and Royspec filed two briefs as petitioners: an
original on July 31, 1992, and a reply brief on October 8, 1992. The United States as amicus
curiae submitted a brief on July 31, 1992 supporting the petitioners.
Scott and Vivian Nelson filed a brief as respondents on September 8, 1992. The
International Human Rights Law Group, The Minnesota Lawyers International Human
Rights Committee, The Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic of the Yale
Law School, and the Center for Constitutional Rights, combined to file a brief on September
8, 1992, as amici curiae in support of respondents.
The questions presented in request for certiorari were:
(1) Do U.S. courts have jurisdiction under commercial activity exception in Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act to review inherently sovereign law enforcement activities of
foreign state carried out in that country?
(2) Does FSIA confer jurisdiction over suit challenging conduct of foreign state when
commercial activity of that foreign state in United States is unrelated to noncommercial conduct forming basis of suit?
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 60 U.S.L.W. 3823 (U.S. June 9, 1992) (No. 91-522). It has been suggested that the more appropriate issue before the Court was "whether the sovereign may use
means that might otherwise be treated as an exercise of sovereign governmental power to
address commercially created problems and thereby avoid what would otherwise be under the
jurisdiction of the United States courts." Michael P. Waxman, Can Governmental Action
Shield Otherwise Commercial Activity Under the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act?, 1992-93
Pp-nvrnw U.S. Sup. Or. CAsEs 137, 139 (Nov. 30, 1992). As Professor Waxman predicted,
however, the Court left the question for another day. Id. at 139-40.
134. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 1474 (1993). Justice Souter was joined by
Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. Id. Justice Kennedy, with the exception of
the last paragraph, also joined the majority. Id. Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun,
wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 1481 (White & Blackmun, JJ., concurring). Justice Blackmun wrote a opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 1484 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Blackmun and
Stevens, wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. (Kennedy, Blackmun,
& Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Finally, Justice Stevens submitted a
dissenting opinion. Id. at 1487 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 1477. In reaching this decision, the Court did not decide the issue of whether
the commercial activity had substantial contact with the United States. Id.
136. Id. (citations omitted). Souter's characterization of the relevant conduct has been
criticized. Wolf, supra note 6, at 18 (arguing Souter's focus solely on the Saudi Arabian law
enforcement conduct was improper). Wolf asserts that if the majority would have focused on
each of the named defendants individually, specifically the Hospital, as required under the
FSIA, it would not have "characterize[d] what was clearly private or commercial conduct as
sovereign in nature." Id. Even if the Court had focused on each individual defendant, however, this would not alter the fact that the acts in question were those of the Saudi Arabian
government, and thus outside the exception's parameters.
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upon" meant for determining whether the activity was commercial, 37
the Court identified the personal injuries and intentional torts alleged in
the Nelsons' complaint as the activities forming the suit.' 38 The Court
such activities did not qualify as commercial under the
concluded that
39
exception.
The Court supported its conclusion by distinguishing between an activity's nature and purpose.140 It relied on the definitions provided in
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,"4 ' which specifically prohibit a
court from looking at the motivation behind the activity in question. 142
The Court declared: "The conduct boils down to abuse of power of its
police by the Saudi Government, and however monstrous such abuse
undoubtedly may be, a foreign state's exercise of the power of its police
has long been understood for purposes of the restrictive theory as peculiarly sovereign in nature.' 4 3 The Court concluded that since the exercise of police power was not an act in which a private person could
engage, the Nelsons' lawsuit was based on a sovereign act and thus did
not fall within the exception. 44 This conclusion exemplifies the current
loophole in the commercial activity exception.
B.

The Loophole and Analysis

The legislative history of the FSIA declares that a foreign government's employment of laborers is an example of a state engaging in commercial activity.' 45 The Nelson decision, however, holds that an act by a
sovereign body, although during the course of or as a direct result of this
commercial activity, can eliminate the "commercialness" of the claim."46
137. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1477-78.
138. Id. at 1478.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1478-79.
141. 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992).
142. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1478-79; see also id. at 1480 (declaring that any analysis of the
Saudi government's motivation would be addressing the "purpose" of the activity, and therefore would be irrelevant).
143. Id. at 1479 (citations omitted).
144. Id. at 1480. The Court also denied the Nesons' failure to warn claim for separate
reasons. Id.
145.. The history states that, "'a foreign government's... employment... of laborers' [is

an example] of commercial activity of the state." Berkovitz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 735
F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir.) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 51, at 16, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6615), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1035 (1984).
146. The FSIA's language requires the court to analyze only the nature of the activity on
which the action is based. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(2), 1603(d) (1988); see also Waxman, supra
note 133 (identifying the actual issue before the Court but accurately predicting that the question would be left for another day).
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In other words, so long as a foreign state utilizes a government entity, it
can opt-in or opt-out of United States courts' jurisdiction at will. 14 7 This
result undermines the intent of the FSIA. Immunity was intended for
foreign states unless they engage in commercial activity that has substantial contact with the United States.148 Case law clearly establishes that
employment-related activity is commercial. For example, Chief Justice
Marshall, in a somewhat similar context, acknowledged:
When a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it
devests itself... of its sovereign character, and takes that of a
private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its
privileges..., it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character which belongs 49
to its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted.1
Likewise, in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,'50 the
Court acknowledged that foreign governments acting in their commercial capacities "do not exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns. Instead,
they exercise only those powers that can also be exercised by private
15 1
citizens.'
Saudi Arabia clearly divested itself of its sovereign character and acted in its commercial capacity when it recruited, hired, and employed
Scott Nelson. Saudi Arabia's commercial involvement is apparent in
three instances. First, Saudi Arabia entered the commercial marketplace
by using an American corporation to recruit and advertise for the position in the American marketplace. Second, Saudi Arabia hired Nelson
in the typical commercial manner of having him sign an employment
contract. Finally, Saudi Arabia's commercial actions continued into Nelson's working environment. In effect, the government of Saudi Arabia
was everything a commercial employer would be. No distinction can be
147. Justice White acknowledged this in his concurrence stating that "had the hospital
retaliated against Nelson by hiring thugs to do the job" the act would not have obtained sovereign status. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1482 (White, J., concurring). Further, Justice White argued
that the purpose of the restrictive theory is to prevent "foreign states from taking refuge behind their sovereignty when they act as market participants." Id.at 1483 (White, J.,
concurring).
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988).
149. Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907 (1824), quoted
in Nelson, 113 S.Ct. at 1483 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695-96 (1976) (plurality opinion).
150. 425 U.S. 682, 695-96 (1976) (plurality opinion).
151. Id.at 704; see also Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2160, 2166 (1992)
(declaring that "[w]hen a foreign government acts, not as regulator of a market but in the
manner of a private player within that market, its actions are 'commercial' within the meaning
of the FSIA").
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drawn between a regular nonstate merchant employer's role and that
played by the Saudi government. Saudi Arabia's choice of enforcing its
commercial policies, the policies of the Hospital in reporting safety violations, through the use of a governmental agency, is not the typical sovereign governmental police power activity. Rather, the typical police
power activity occurs when a criminal act or policy has been violated.
However, although merely an arm of the merchant-acting government
employer, the actions of Saudi governmental agents cannot be questioned because they, under the present FSIA, are considered sovereign."5 2 Thus, the Nelsons are denied justice.
V.

THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

"Foreign policy must be clear, consistent and confident."
-Dwight D. Eisenhower 5 3
Foreign states should not be able to evade American jurisdiction and
American law through questionable claims of sovereign immunity. The
United States must firmly decide whether a foreign state should be subject to suit in our country. The FSIA sends a conflicting message. On
one hand, foreign states are told they will be held accountable in United
States courts if they engage in commercial activity. On the other hand,
foreign states are also told that so long as they take care of their commercial problems through the use of a sovereign entity, their conduct
will not be questioned by American courts. Because of this conflicting
message, this section outlines additional reasons for legislative action
and offers a proposed solution.
A.

Reasons for Legislative Action

The changing world market, the increased role of the United States
in the global economy, and the interests of justice-all demand that
Congress amend the commercial activity exception. A clear, consistent,
and confident message must be sent to the international community.
The restrictive approach, adopted first in the Tate Letter and then
codified in the FSIA, emerged in response to the expanding world market, and more specifically, in response to foreign states leaving their
152. Consider this far-fetched example. If there had been some sort of contract for the
Saudi police's abuse, the Court could then look into the Saudi police's reasons for the physical
abuse. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text. Then, the commercial character would
appear.
153. Dwight D. Eisenhower, State of the Union Message (Feb. 2, 1953), in PoLITcAL
QUOTATIONS, supra note 1, at 100.
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traditional roles and entering the marketplace. 54 Since then, the international commercial marketplace has grown immensely.155 Foreign
states are uniting to meet these changes through treaties or communities,
such as the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)156 and the
1992 European Economic Community. 157 In addition, while unemployment currently plagues the industrialized nations, 158 the demand for
highly educated and technically skilled individuals in developing nations
has increased, 59 particularly in the fields of medicine, agriculture, and
business fields.' 60 America's increased trade between the United States
and Mexico as a result of NAFTA will only exacerbate this movement of
skilled individuals.' 61 Thus, skilled Americans like Scott Nelson are
likely to be increasingly enticed to work in foreign states for foreign
nations. 162
154. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
156. See North America Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the United
States of America, the Government of Canada, and the Government of the Mexican States,
U.S. Government Printing Office (signed Dec. 18, 1992, and released Jan. 20, 1993).
157. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) (unofficial English translation) (establishing the Internal Market as of Dec.
31, 1992).
158. According to Michael Hansenne, Director General of the United Nations' International Labour Organization in Geneva, "For the first time since the Great Depression, the
industrialized nations, as well as developing nations, are facing long-term, persistent unemployment .... The employment situation [is] a global crisis." Michael Arndt, Fewer Workers,
Fewer World Shoppers; FadingJobs Overseas Cut U.S. Exports, Cm. TRm., Mar. 13,1994, § 7,
at 1.
159. For example, in 1992, the United States, Russia, and Germany announced plans to
employ nuclear scientists from the former Soviet Union to keep them from accepting offers in
developing nations. David Hoffman, Ex-Soviet Scientists to Get Aid; Center to Employ Nuclear Experts; Yeltsin, Baker Meet, WASH. PosT, Feb. 18, 1992, at Al. CIA Director Robert M.
Gates asked Congress to adopt the plan because he feared a "brain drain" of these scientists
to countries such as Cuba, Syria, Algeria, and India. 1d.
160. John Zarocostas, Firms Urged to Offer Farm Insurance in Little-Tapped Developing
World, J. COM., Feb. 24, 1993, at A10 (identifying that one of the most inhibiting factors for
developing countries is the "lack of technical know-how of operational processes, inadequate
infrastructure and support services, and difficulties in product development and
improvement").
161. A great concern over the United States workforce losing blue-collar jobs to cheaper
Mexican workers has developed. See Christopher J. Martin, The NAFTA Debate:Are Concerns About U.S. Job Migration to Mexico Legitimate?, EMPLOYEE REL. L.J., Winter 1993-94,
at 239. Likewise, however, someone will be needed to organize the labor, manufacturing, and
industrial growth. Most likely, many highly trained Americans will be sought out as advisors.
162. Furthermore, human rights abuses are typically more prevalent in the developing
states. See generally Eve B. Burton, Note, Leasing Rights: A New InternationalInstrumentfor
Protecting Refugees and Compensating Host Countries, 19 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. Rnv. 307,
310-11 (1988) (discussing developing nations' problems in protecting refugees from human
rights abuses).
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The United States has a duty to protect its citizens who are recruited
and
employed in foreign states. While the United States may interby
vene when an American citizen is being harmed or detained abroad,163
the only redress the injured citizen has upon return to the United States
is the FSIA. 64
Sources of international redress, like the International Court of Justice, are also unavailable to injured American citizens for two reasons.
First, actions before the International Court can be brought only by individual states, not citizens. 65 Second, the foreign state involved must
consent to the International Court hearing the case or else the International Court lacks jurisdiction.' 66
Thus, given the current loophole in the FSIA, American citizens are
ultimately left uncompensated. Foreign states can shed their sovereign
nature, enter the marketplace and freely violate an American's internationally protected human rights, knowing their actions will not be questioned in a United States court. America prides itself on the justice, or
the protection, of human rights in this country. As such, justice demands
that these citizens have redress and protection through the United States
courts. To provide such redress, the commercial activity exception must
be modified to cover those foreign states choosing to enter the marketplace, availing themselves of the privileges of the United States, ultimately employing American citizens, and then denying them their
internationally protected human rights.
163. Hostage Act of 1868,22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1988 & Supp. 111990), requires the President
to take certain action whenever he becomes aware "that any citizen of the United States has
been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign government." 22
U.S.C. § 1732 (1988 & Supp. IH1990); see Kevin D. Hughes, Comment, Hostages' Rights: The
Unhappy Legal Predicamentof an American Held in Foreign Captivity, 26 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 555, 561-64 (1993); Abner J. Mikva & Gerald L. Neuman, The Hostage Crisis and the
"Hostage Act," 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 292, 299-301 (1982).
The Supreme Court, in dicta in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 676-77 (1981),
declared that the Hostage Act was "passed in response" to some countries' refusal to acknowledge American citizenship of naturalized citizens travelling abroad in the 19th century
and was thus quite different than contemporary hostage situations; but the Court has since
declined to review lower court decisions applying the Act's duty to, at a minimum, perform an
investigation into the justifiability of the imprisonment of American citizens by foreign governments. E.g., Flynn v. Schultz, 748 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 474 U.S. 830
(1985).
164. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989).
165. LCJ. Stat. art. 34, reprintedin SHABTAI RoSENNE, THm WoRL CoURT WHAT IT IS
AND How IT WonKS 205 (1962).
166. A foreign state's consent is the basis of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. I.C.J.
Stat. art. 36(2), reprintedin RosENNE, supra note 165, at 205-06.
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B. A Proposed Solution
This proposal promotes Chief Justice Marshall's statement that when
a sovereign makes a choice to enter the marketplace, it cannot later
choose to claim immunity for its actions within that marketplace. 67 This
proposal requires Congress to enumerate a five-step analysis. The proposal is intended to apply only to employment-related claims.
The five-step proposal is first summarized and then detailed. 168 As a
first step, the courts should identify the specific activity in question. Second, the courts should consider the personal jurisdiction of the foreign
state. Third, the courts should apply the proper judicial test for determining whether the activity involved was "commercial." If the activity is
deemed commercial, the inquiry would cease, and the court would have
jurisdiction. However, if the activity is not commercial, the inquiry
would continue. As a fourth step, the courts should consider whether
the cause of action alleged an abuse of an internationally protected
human right. Finally, if the cause of action alleged such an abuse, the
courts would then look at the reasons alleged in the complaint for the
violation. If the reasons alleged in the compliant are deemed commercial, the courts would have jurisdiction. If the cause of action did not
allege an abuse of internationally protected human rights, the case
would be dismissed.
A more detailed description of each element of the proposal follows,
supplemented by an application of the elements to the facts of Saudi
Arabia v. Nelson.1 69 The elements are the central issue. With the exception of the personal jurisdiction element, whether Congress specifically
outlines a test for each item or leaves it up to the courts is immaterial.
1. Identify the Activity in Question
To identify the activity in question, the Supreme Court's analysis in
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson 70 would be appropriate. Congress should instruct the courts to determine what conduct forms the "basis" or "foundation" of the cause of action.' 7 ' The determination would be made by
167. Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907 (1824); see
supra note 149 and accompanying text.
168. The first three steps could be adopted for all causes of action. However, a clearer
definition of "commercial activity" would then be warranted. See Donoghue, supranote 65, at
526.
169. 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
170. Id
171. Id. at 1477.
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looking at "those elements of a claim that, if proven, would entitle a
plaintiff to relief."'"
In doing so, the Nelson Court concluded that the conduct forming the
basis of the cause of action was the detention and torture inflicted on
Scott Nelson by the Saudi Arabian police authorities.
2. Determine the Personal Jurisdiction of the Foreign State
To determine the personal jurisdiction of the foreign state, Congress
should adopt the "minimum contacts test" for jurisdiction as outlined in
InternationalShoe Company v. Washington. 73 Furthermore, Congress
should require the courts to apply this analysis prior to determining
whether the activity is commercial. The minimum contacts standard in
this context focuses on whether the foreign state had sufficient contacts
with the United States when it engaged in employment activities with
the American citizen. Sufficient contacts would exist if the foreign state
had "substantial contact" with' 74 or purposefully availed itself' 7 of the
privileges of the United States, such that it could reasonably anticipate
being subject to the United States' jurisdiction. 7 6 The acts in question
should be required to be continual and not random, fortuitous, or
attenuated. 77
The minimum contacts standard would shape consistent case law by
allowing the lower courts to apply a universal test.' 78 Furthermore, the
minimum contacts test does not conflict with the current requirement
that the foreign state have substantial contact with the United States. 7 9
In addition, by having the courts apply the minimum contacts test prior
to making a determination of the characterization of the activity, courts
would avoid unnecessarily reaching complex immunity cases. 180
172. Id. (citing Santos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 934 F.2d 890, 893 (7th Cir.
1991); Millen Indus., Inc. v. Coordination Council for N. Am. Affairs, 855 F.2d 879, 885 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1109 (5th Cir. 1985)).
173. 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
174. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (citations omitted).
175. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
176. World-Vide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (citations

omitted).

177. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 487 (1985).

178. Currently, the courts are applying numerous tests. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
179. In utilizing the minimum contacts test, the United States Supreme Court has frequently noted that it requires a finding that the entity had "substantial" contacts with that
particular state. E.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,223 (1957) (declaring
it would be sufficient for jurisdiction if a "substantial connection" exists).
180. Donoghue, supra note 65, at 526.
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In applying the minimum contacts standard to the facts of Nelson, it
is clear the United States' courts would have personal jurisdiction over
Saudi Arabia. Although Saudi Arabia contracted with an American corporation to advertise for the position in the United States, the contract
designated full control of all employment decisions to Saudi Arabia.'81
Moreover, Saudi Arabia had Nelson sign the employment contract in the
United States,"s and Saudi Arabia, through the American corporation,
83
held the orientation session for the position in the United States.
Thus, Saudi Arabia has sufficient contacts and the analysis continues.
3. Determine Whether the Activity in Question Was Commercial
The "commercial" determination under this proposal takes on less
significance than the current approach, since an additional step has been
added.18" As a result, it is not necessary to formulate a new test. In fact,
analyzing other foreign states' models identifies that a more specific
"commercial" determination does not alleviate the current problem
under the FSIA. For example, the British, Australian, and European
Convention immunity acts all have special provisions for employment
contracts that deny a foreign state immunity unless the contract specifically provides otherwise." s The Australian immunity act' 86 is generally
consistent with the existing FSIA: It identifies and includes additional
specific commercial exceptions, such as a foreign state contracting "for
the supply of goods or services" or for a foreign state granting a "guarantee or indemnity in respect of a financial obligation."'' 7 However, none
of these tests, including the current test requiring the identification of
the "nature" of the activity as compared to the "purpose" of the activity,
closes the current loophole in the FSIA, as none qualify the abuse of
police power as commercial.'
181. Respondents' Brief, at 6, Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993) (No. 91-522).
182. Nelson, 113 S.Ct. at 1474-75.
183. Id.; see supra note 104.
184. See infra Step 4.
185. State Immunity Act 1978 §§ 3, 4, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123, 1124 (1978) (U.K.);
Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 No. 196 §§ 11, 12, reprintedin 25 I.L.M. 715, 718 (1986)
(Austrl.); European Convention on State Immunity, art. 5, EuRoP. T.S. No. 74 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 470, 471-72 (1972) (European Convention).
186. Foreign States Immunities Act 1985, No. 196, § 11 (Austl.), reprinted in 25 I.L.M.
715, 718 (1986).
187. Id. § 11(3). The Australian model, however, explicitly declares that a contract of
employment does not constitute commercial activity. Id.
188. The British, Australian, and European Convention immunity acts grant immunity
only if the cause of action is based on a breach of the employment contract. Here, the cause
of action was based on the abuses infficted by the Saudi law enforcement agents. Likewise,
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The additional steps of this proposal make the commercial activity
test less significant in the context of an employment-related claim, and as
a result, the current test would be sufficient. However, to end lower
court confusion, Congress could define the terms "nature" and "purpose" of the current test, or adopt those definitions laid out in Republic
of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.'8 9
Irrespective of whether Congress adopts a new test or retains the current test, any determination that the activity in question was commercial
would end the jurisdiction inquiry. However, if the activity is determined to be noncommercial, because of the general nature of employment-related activities, 190 the inquiry would continue.
Because the isolated "nature" or "outward form of the conduct 1 91
that Saudi Arabia performed was the activity of law enforcement agents,
the activities in Nelson would not be commercial under the nature or
purpose distinction. However, because the law enforcement activities
were allegedly implemented as a result of employment-related activities,
the inquiry would continue.
4. Determine Whether the Cause of Action Alleges a Violation of an
Internationally Protected Human Right
In step four, Congress would instruct the courts to determine
whether the complaint alleged an abuse of an internationally protected
human right. If such an abuse were alleged, Congress would then instruct the courts to proceed to step five. If no such violation were alleged, the foreign state would be granted immunity and the inquiry
would cease.
Numerous scholars have suggested that the violation of international
law should be a separate exception to the FSIA, and thus constitute a
waiver of immunity. 92 Professor Paust contends that to continue granting immunity to those states engaging specifically in human rights violations or terrorism "would be to further illegality, [and] give it legal
the Australian Immunity provision explicitly categorizes other activities as commercial, but
does not specifically include the abuse of police power in a employment setting.
189. 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992); see supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
191. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2167.

192. See, RANDALL, supra note 26, at 96-101; Jordan J. Paust, Draft Brief Concerning
Claims to ForeignSovereign Immunity and Human Rights: Nonimmunityfor Violations of InternationalLaw Under the FSIA, 8 Hous. J. INT'L L. 49, 65-67 (1985); Adam C. Belsky et al.,
Comment, Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations
of PeremptoryNorms of InternationalLaw, 77 CAL. L. REv. 365 (1989).
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effect.... This a court of law cannot do. Thus, a violation of law poses
the one necessary exception to immunity, one implicitly necessary in any
truly legal system."' 193 However, since the violation of an international
law is not enumerated in any of the eight FSIA exceptions, the courts
cannot claim jurisdiction based solely on such a violation. 194 In Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 9 5 the Supreme Court

declared no jurisdiction existed based on a violation of international law
under the
FSIA because such a violation was not contained in the
6
19

FSIA.

This Comment does not attempt to analyze whether a full exception
to immunity based on an international law violation should be enumerated. Rather, the Comment analyzes the foreign state's conduct in light
of international human rights customary norms to merely assist in determining whether the United States has jurisdiction over a foreign state.
The result would make foreign states' sovereign authority give ultimate
deference and respect to an American citizen's fundamental human
rights and liberties.' 9 7

In determining whether a human right has become "customary" for
jurisdictional purposes, the courts should follow the Restatement (Third)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which lists certain
abuses considered to be violations of customary international law. 98
Specifically, the Restatement declares that a foreign state is violating international law if, as a matter of policy, "it practices, encourages, or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the murder or causing
the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or (g) a consistent1 pattern
of gross
99
violations of internationally recognized human rights.'
Adopting the Restatement is appropriate for three reasons. First,
although the burden would remain with the parties to ultimately establish whether a certain right has reached the level of "customary international law," the Restatement already enumerates certain abuses which

193.
194.
195.
196.

Paust, supra note 192, at 59 (emphasis added).
See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983).
109 S. Ct. 683 (1989).
Id. at 689-91.

197.
198.

RANDALL,

supra note 26, at 99.
supra note 55, § 702.

RE-sTATEmENT,

199. Id.
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have reached the "customary" level.200 Second, the enumeration gives
foreign states notice of those abuses that will not be tolerated. Finally,
the Restatement allows flexibility in the event that additional rights attain
a customary
status or certain rights enumerated fall below a customary
01
status3
As noted earlier, the analysis of international customary norms
would only assist the courts in determining jurisdiction. Two additional
elements would be prerequisites to undertaking the international law
analysis. Specifically, the cause of action must first involve the employment of an American citizen, 2°0 and second, a determination must already be made that the foreign state has sufficient contacts with the
United States.20 3 In addition, the analysis would not end with a determination that a customary international human right law was violated. The
Court would still be required to proceed to step five and look at the
purpose of the activity in question. 2°
Applying Nelson's allegations of detention and torture to this step,
his allegations would be considered violations of customary internationally protected human rights. Prolonged arbitrary detention and torture
are recognized in the Restatement."° In addition, both abuses would survive any challenge Saudi Arabia could make that they were not principles of customary international law. For example, being subject to
prolonged arbitrary detainment or being held without a judicial determination is prohibited by most comprehensive international human rights
instruments. 0 6 The right to be free from arbitrary detention is also pro200. A legal principle attains "customary" international status when foreign states gener-

ally recognize that a certain practice is obligatory. IAN

BRowNmE, PRINCn,'LS OF PUBLIC

INTmERATiONAL LAw 4

(4th ed. 1990). Four elements of custom exist including, the requiring
of certain duration, the uniformity and consistency of practice, the generality of practice, and a
general practice that is accepted as law. Id. at 5-7.
201. RFsTATEmNT, supra note 55, § 702(g) (offering the final option of "a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights").

202. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
203. See supra Step 2.
204. See infra Step 5.

205.

R.sTATEmENT,

supra note 55, § 702(d), (e).

206. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., arts. 8, 9, pt.1, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 71 (1948) (unanimously acknowledging the right to
be free from arbitrary arrest and detainment and requiring competent national tribunals to
make determinations where fundamental rights are being abridged) [hereinafter Universal
Declaration]; The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI),
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1986, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at art. 9, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (requiring that one continually detained be
entitled to proceedings before a court to determine the detention's lawfulness) [hereinafter
International Convention]; The American Convention on Human Rights, art. 7, Nov. 22, 1969,
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tected in the constitutions of 118 nations.2 °7 The International Court of
Justice, whose decisions are generally regarded as principles of customary international law, has also acknowledged the right to be free from
arbitrary detention. 0 In addition, the right to be free from torture and
other degrading treatment is a universally recognized principle in a
number of international instruments 20 9 and at least eighty-one national
constitutions.

210

Nelson alleged that he was detained after his arrest for over thirtynine days without being told the reason for his detention or being
brought before a judicial tribunal.2 11 Additionally, Nelson alleged that
Saudi law enforcement officials tortured him 212 and confined him to an
overcrowded, rat-infested cell area where he often had to fight other
prisoners for food.21 3 These allegations clearly suggest international violations of prolonged arbitrary arrest and detainment, and torture or
cruel and inhuman treatment. Thus, the courts would continue their inquiry to the final step.

O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEAISer. LtV/II. 23 doc. 21 rev. 6 (1970),
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (entered into force, July 18, 1978); Organization of African
Unity: Banjul Charter on Human and People's Rights, art. 6, O.A.U. Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.
5, reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 5, 6, 213 U.N.T.S. 226, 228.
207. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of CriminalJustice: Identifying
InternationalProcedural Protectionsand Equivalent Protectionsin National Constitutions,3
DuKEn J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 261 (1993).
208. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.CJ.
3, 43 (May 24).
209. Universal Declaration, supra note 206; Draft Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985,
G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess. Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A139/51 (1985), reprintedin 23
I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified Feb. 4, 1985 in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985); International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966,
660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1969), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969);
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Nov.
4, 1950, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1955); European Convention for the Prevention of Torture
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, signed Nov. 26, 1987, reprintedin 27
I.L.M. 1152 (1988); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty
Series No. 36, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. I/V/I. 23 doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979), reprintedin 9 LL.M.
99 (1970) (entered into force, July 18, 1978).
210. Bassiouni, supra note 207, at 263 n.128 (listing the 81 state constitutions adopting the
right to be free from torture).
211. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471, 1475 (1993).
212. Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528, 1529 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
213. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1475.
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5. Analyze the Reasons Alleged in the Complaint for the Activity
Producing the Human Rights Violation
If the activity in question was alleged to have violated an internationally protected human right, Congress should instruct the courts to look
behind the activity and analyze the alleged reasons or purpose for the
activity. If the reasons for the activity were commercial, then the courts
would have jurisdiction. If the activity were not for a commercial purpose, the state would receive immunity.
Admittedly, this would depart from the current FSIA requirement 14
and recent case law.215 This test, however, would ensure that the intent
of the FSIA is carried out. In addition, the test is applied in the midst of
several safeguards. Specifically, prior to analyzing the purpose of the
sovereign's activity, the court would already have determined that the
cause of action involved the employment of an American citizen, that
the sovereign had sufficient contacts with the United States, and that the
sovereign allegedly violated an individual's internationally protected
human rights.
Returning again to the facts of Nelson, the courts could then look
behind the outward nature of the police activity and analyze whether the
law enforcement activity was alleged to have been commercially motivated. Scott Nelson explicitly declared that his detention and torture
resulted from his employment related activities.216 Specifically, Scott
Nelson alleged he had repeatedly reported safety violations to the Saudl
Arabian owned hospital but was told to ignore them. 1 7 Refusing to ignore the violations, Nelson alleged he again reported the violations. 1 8
As a direct result from this final report, Nelson alleged he was detained
and tortured which left him permanently disabled.219 Thus, the Saudi
law enforcement activity addressing commercially related problems
would provide Scott Nelson and the American courts with jurisdiction.

214. The current FSIA prohibits courts from looking at the purpose of an activity to determine its commercial character. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).
215. E.g., Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992).
216. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1476. Because the case appeared before the Court on a motion
to dismiss, the Court must assume the allegations in the complaint are true. United States v.
Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327 (1991).
217. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1476.
218. d.
219. I&
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C. Analysis of the Proposal
The enumeration of the five-part analysis would serve two purposes.
First, it would ease the United States government's foreign policy concerns over the question of a foreign state's police activities. The government fears that "if police activities of foreign states are deemed
commercial and questioned and punished in United States courts, it is
likely the law enforcement conduct of the United States will also be
called into account in foreign courts." 0 By adopting this proposal,
however, United States courts would only be judging those acts that
were violations of internationallaw, not law peculiar only to the United
States. Thus, while United States law enforcement may be called into
courts of other nations, it would only be for the violation of an internationally protected human right.
Second, enumeration of this proposal would send a clear, confident
message to the international community that the United States will not
tolerate abuses of internationally protected human rights. The United
States acknowledges the importance of the protection of individual
human rights within its boundaries."' The contradiction of outlawing an
act and then granting immunity when the outlaw is brought to court
should not continue.' Moreover, the United States, as a signatory to
the United Nations Charter, is required to take joint and separate action
to protect human rights.12 3 Thus, granting immunity to human rights violators breaches the United States' obligation to other members of the
international community. Finally, this proposal would not deter states
from seeking American citizens as employees because the states would
be called into American courts only if they had violated an internationally protected human right. Rather, once adopted, this proposal would
serve as notice that if a foreign state chooses to enter the marketplace,
abuse American citizens, and deny them their internationally protected
human rights, it will be held responsible in United States courts.
The weakness of the proposal lies with the uncertainty of what constitutes "international law" and the United States courts' competency to
220. Petitioners' Brief at 25, Nelson (No. 91-522). The government continues, stating "if
the prevailing law in this country is that foreign police activity can be judged in our courts by
our standards, it will be difficult or impossible for the United States successfully to claim
immunity elsewhere." Id.

221. See REsTATEmENT, supra note 55, § 702.
222. RANDALL, supra note 26, at 100.
223. The Charter requires all members to "take joint and separate action" to bring about
the "universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all." U.N. CHARTER arts. 55(c), 56, reprintedin RosENNE, supra note 165, at 190.
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make those ongoing determinations. By adopting the Restatement,224
this problem may be somewhat eliminated. Granted, it is doubtful there
will ever be one single instrument defining the substance of what specifically constitutes international law. However, for now, in the interest of
justice, this approach adequately balances the interests of a foreign state,
the foreign policy of the United States, and the well-being of American
citizens.
V.

CONCLUSION

The United States must convey a clear and confident foreign policy
message to the international community. Justice requires that American
citizens have some judicial recourse when they are denied their internationally protected human rights. As foreign states increasingly recruit
and hire American citizens, America needs to take proactive measures
to protect its citizens. Thus, foreign policy and justice require that Congress amend the commercial activity exception to the FSIA. Justice demands it.
AMELIA L. MCCARTHr

224. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.

